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IntroductiOlL Petroleum consump-
tion in the world has doubled during 
the 1 ~60's and is likely to double 
again in the period from 1970-1980. 
To meet these projected demands, 
nations will increasingly turn toward 
the last largely untapped reservoirs of 
oil and gas, the oceans. In the United 
States-the major oil producer among 
the large non-Communist industrial 
countries-new additions to proved 
onshore reserves are no longer the 
result of newly discovered fields but 
are instead caused by improved re-
covery techniques for already pro-
ducing wells. .Aside from continuing 
improvements in recovery techniques, 
new fields with vast petroleum po-
tential are likely to be found in Alaska 
and beneath the continental margins 
around the United States. 
The two other major industrial 
giants in the Western World, Western 
Europe and Japan, are in a far less 
enviable position than the United 
States. Neither has large reserves or 
even substantial potential petroleum 
resources on land and consequently are 
largely dependent on the Middle East. 
These Persian Gulf States contain more 
than one-half of the world's proved oil 
reserves, but because of monopolistic 
practices and political instability have 
been unable to guarantee supplies at a 
relatively stable price. Japan and 
Europe may succeed in partially di-
versifying their sources of oil and gas 
supplies through offshore development 
because liquid hydrocarbons in the 
oceans are known to be widely dis-
tributed around the world. Marine 
geologists believe that the ultimate 
recoverable yield of petroleum from 
the oceans is at least equal to, and 
probably larger than reserves and re-
sources on land. Hence, offshore 
production, which increased sixfold 
between 1960-69 and contributes 
approximately 18 percent of the cur-
rent world production of oil, is ex-
pected to continue to grow faster than 
onshore exploitation and should con-
tribute about 35 percent of total oil 
production by 1980. While recent 
rapid increases of the posted prices of 
crude oil and natural gas will speed up 
exploratory activities, uncertainty 
about ownership of parts of the 
seabed, investment guarantees, and 
environmental legislation are bound to 
have a retarding effect until such prob-
lems have been solved. 
Fonnation . of Oil and Gas. Oil is 
formed from the remains of marine 
plants and animals that rest in fine-
grained mineral particles such as clay 
or carbonate muds deposited on the 
sea-floor. Whenever coarse-grained 
sediments like sand are present, the 
organic substance-under high pressure 
and over a period of millions of 
years-will migrate into the pervious 
sand bodies (reservoir beds), where 
the change of environment may turn 
the substance into a thick coherent 
mass of concrete oil particles. 
This process by itself is not suf-
ficient to form oilfields. In order to 
concentrate liquid hydrocarbons in 
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commercially attractive quantities 
from broad areas of the reservoir bed 
into smaller areas where it can be 
tapped, certain geological structures 
caused by movements _in the earth's 
crust must have been formed to trap _ 
oil and gas and prevent further mi-
gration into pervious sediments. Traps 
occur in the form of folds caused by 
lateral compression of sediments, by 
local bending caused by penetration 
of salt pillars (salt domes, diapirs) in 
the overlying sediments, and by 
regional compaction of thick sedi-
ments over buried hills.l 
Few areas of the seabed meet all 
these conditions for the formation 
and accumulation of oil and gas. For 
example, one expert maintains that 
the North Sea, an area of about 
200,000 square nautical miles, prob-
ably contains only a few hundred 
square miles with petroleum poten-
tial.2 
Location of Oil and Gas. The sea-
bed is divided into four distinct areas: 
the Continental Shelf, Continental 
Slope, Continental Rise, and the 
AbYssal Plain or deep-seabed. The 
shelf, slope, and rise, although deeply 
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Of the different parts of the seabed, 
the Continental Shelves, which contain 
about one-half of the sedimentary strata 
under the continental margins, are ex-
pected to have the best potential for oil 
and gas accumulation. Not all countries 
are equally blessed with extensive 
shelves. There are great variations in 
width and thickness of sedimentation 
and in stratigraphic and structural fea-
tures which trap the migrating oil and 
gas. Generally, sedimentation is de-
posited off flat coasts, and the shelves 
off most mountainous coasts appear. to 
be largely erosional in origin because 
they are shallowly underlain by bed-
rock.3 The Continental Slopes are still 
largely a mystery, and except for the 
upper slopes, cannot be considered very 
favorable prospects for petroleum ac-
cumulation. This is because .there are 
fewer layers that are coarse-grained 
enough to be satisfactory reservoir beds 
for the migration of oil.4 There is 
considerable disagreement among ma-
rine geologists about the potential for 
oil and gas beneath the Continental 
Rise. Those arguing against a high petro-
leum potential on the rise point out that 
sediments tend to be low in organic 
matter due to oxidation in the very 
slowly deposited sediments. Others, 
however, believe that the rise may con-
tain substantial oil deposits and that 
rich source beds may have been re-
deposited from the upper slope by 
turbidity currents, gravity slides, sub-
marine slumps, and bottom currents.5 
Proponents of this theory also point at 
the presence of favorable structures on 
the Continental Rise necessary to trap 
oil and gas. 
Beyond the Continental Rise very 
little is known. Deep-sea sedimentation 
is generally very thin and thus not likely 
to contain much oil. An exception may 
be made for semienclosed seas, where 
geologists have on several occasions lo-
cated structures suggestive of potential 
oil and gas accumulation beneath the 
Abyssal Plain (Gulf of Mexico and the 
Mediterranean). At one point a research 
ship did find a trace of oil in a core 
drilled in water of 11,720 feet in the 
Gulf of Mexico.6 
Reserves and Resources. Petroleum 
resources can be divided into three basic 
groups: proved reserves, supplementary 
reserves, and undiscovered potential re-
sources. Proved reserves are those which 
geologic and engineering data demon-
strate with reasonable certainty to be 
recoverable from known reservoirs 
under existing economic and operating 
conditions. In the United States this is 
usually no more than one-third to one-
fourth of the oil in place. Of the 
remaining estimated petroleum in 
known reservoirs, the part that may be 
recovered with the use of improved 
secondary and tertiary techniques is 
called supplementary reserves. Addi-
tions from supplementary to proved 
reserves are subject to technological 
developments and, even more on the 
margin between prices and costs. Esti-
mates of potential resources are based 
on the premise that a given volume or 
area of sediments in a basin which is 
favorable for hydrocarbon generation 
and entrapment should ultimately yield 
a predictable volume of hydrocarbons. 
These estimates also consider the geo-
logical history and characteristics of the 
basin and industrial experience in simi-
lar but more extensively explored 
basins. 7 Geologists know that their 
assessments of undiscovered potential 
resources are at best educated guesses, 
useful only in providing information on 
worthwhile exploration areas. The very 
size of the ultimate potential recover-
able oil and gas, recently estimated at 
2,272 billion barrels oil equivalent (in 
contrast to proved offshore reserves of 
100 billion barrels of oil and 131 billion 
cubic feet of natural gas), may be 
confusing.8 It is not the quantity of oil 
and gas beneath the seabed but the 
economic value of these resources that 
is important. At $10 per barrel, the 
potential oil resources would represent a 
value of $20 trillion. However, even if 
technology were available to exploit all 
those resources, the production costs of 
a substantial part of the 2,272 billion 
barrels might far outweigh the revenues 
that could be realized by production. 
But, there is still sufficient cause to 
be generally optimistic about new off-
shore discoveries because more than half 
of the seabed area in 1,000 feet of water 
or less is underlain by young sediments 
of a tertiary age which are known to 
have a relatively high potential for 
petroleum. As much of the large on-
shore oil and gasfields have already been 
discovered, it is likely that the present 
ratio of onshoj:'e to offshore reserves of 
6 to 1 will change considerably in favor 
of new undersea reserves. Even prior to 
recent price hikes of crude oil, United 
Nations sources indicated that new off-
shore fields with reserves totaling as 
much as 140 billion barrels of recover-
able oil would be added to existing 
offshore reserves within this decade. 9 
Geographical Distribution of High 
Potential Areas. North America in gen-
eral, and the United States in particular, 
has been the most active in terms of 
offshore oil and gas exploitation. During 
the 1950's and 1960's, more than 
15,300 wells were drilled off U.S. 
coasts, producing over 4.5 billion barrels 
of oil worth $8.8 billion. 1 0 In contrast 
to onshore areas where new large re-
serves have become very scarce, new 
vast reserves were discovered in offshore 
Louisiana, California, and Alaska. Lewis 
Weeks estimated total recoverable petro-
leum resources of North America up to 
a depth of 1,000 feet at approximately 
20 percent of the world's potential 
resources. 11 On the basis of his 1965 
study, the North American seabed up to 
a depth of 1,000 feet should contain 
about 140 billion barrels, plus 60 billion 
barrels for petroleum liquids exploitable 
by secondary recovery techniques. Esti-
mates made in 1947 by M. King Hub-
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bert for the U.S. Continental Shelf were 
175 billion barrels, and the Weeks study 
puts U.S. petroleum resources beneath 
the continental margins at 270 billion 
barrels.12 A recent study by the Na-
tional Petroleum Council (NPC) projects 
potentially recoverable oil and gas in the 
United States at respectively 385 billion 
barrels and 1,178 trillion cubic feet, of 
which about one-half is said to be in 
Alaska and in offshore areas. 1 3 
Although the U.S. Continental Shelf 
is probably the best known in the 
world, vast areas remain largely un-
explored. For example, the northern 
part of the Gulf of Mexico off Louisiana 
and east Texas, where most of the 
American offshore oil is produced, is 
quite familiar, but much of the southern 
shelf of Texas and the entire Floridian 
shelf still remain untested. Geologists 
also expect to fmd petroleum resources 
on the Continental Slope and Rise as 
well as on the Abyssal Plain of the 
northern gulf. Southern California was 
the major offshore producing area in the 
United States prior to the 1950's when 
the Gulf States took over the lead. The 
area, and in particular the Santa Barbara 
Channel, will continue to be among the 
more promising offshore prospects in 
the country. Discovery of a supergiant 
field on the north slope of Alaska, a 
field which is estimated to contain as 
much as 12.5 billion barrels of oil and 
10 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, has 
drawn attention to the as yet un-
discovered petroleum resources in the 
Gulf of Alaska and in the Beaufort, 
Chukchi, and Bering Seas. 14 Geological 
and geophysical surveys off the Atlantic 
coast have singled out Georges Bank, 
Blake Plateau, and the Baltimore Can-
yon basin as the areas with potential oil 
and gas resources. These, as well as the 
Alaskan prospects, have shown sedimen-
tation and folding favorable for the 
accumulation of oil and gas, but none of 
the prospective areas have been put to 
the test of the drill. 
Favorable conditions continue on the 
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Canadian side of the border. Already 
one discovery of natural gas was made 
on Sable Island, about 100 miles east of 
Nova Scotia, and Canada's Arctic Circle 
may be among the most promising 
prospects in North America. One au-
thoritative source indicates that 
Canada's Arctic islands may constitute 
one of the largest offshore petroleum 
provinces in the world. 1 5 During the 
decade of the seventies, Canada may 
add as much as 56 billion barrels of oil 
and 336 trillion cubic feet of gas to its 
reserves. 1 6 
Outside the United States and Can-
ada, Venezuela is the only major oil 
producer in the Western Hemisphere. 
Most of its current production is from 
Lake Maracaibo, which produces almost 
3 million barrels per day. It appears that 
production from those fields is leveling 
off, and exports from Venezuela have 
subsequently declined. The northeastern 
shelf may offer good prospects for the 
future. Except for Venezuela, Peru, 
Trinidad, and Mexico, other offshore 
ventures in Latin America have proven 
disappointing, and uncertainty about 
the role of foreign investment is likely 
to have a retarding effect on further 
exploration. 
Elsewhere one of the most actively 
explored areas in recent years has been 
the North Sea. Since the beginning of 
exploratory activities in 1967, a total of 
five giant oilfields have been discovered, 
and additional large findings can be 
expected, particularly in the northern 
part of the sea. A recent estimate puts 
potential yield of the North Sea at 
approximately 42 billion barrels of oil 
and no billion cubic feet of gas, 
enough to turn Norway into a net 
petroleum exporter and to make the 
United Kingdom independent from out-
side supplies by the early 1980's. 1 7 
While no other major discoveries have 
been made outside the North Sea, the 
Mediterranean, the Black Sea, Celtic 
Sea, and a few areas off the Atlantic 
coast are known to have potentially 
petroliferous sedimentary formations. 
Asia has the biggest known offshore 
petroleum reserves, and the continental 
margins from India to Korea are among 
the most promising areas in the world. 
Even now, the shallow waters of the 
Persian Gulf produce oil at a rate of 
more than 2.6 million barrels per day. 
Moreover, reservoirs beneath the gulf 
contain about 75 percent of the world's 
proved offshore reserves. 1 8 Indonesia is 
the second biggest producing and oil 
exporting region in Asia, and recent 
wildcat successes off the coast of Kali-
mantan and Sumatra have spurred 
further activities on the vast, yet mainly 
unexplored, Continental Shelves. Ex-
ploratory drilling off South Vietnam, 
Malaysia, and Thailand has discovered 
little, but vast areas of the subcontinent 
remain unexplored due to custody dis-
putes and internal political reasons. 
Economics of Offshore Oil and Gas 
Development. The knowledge that more 
than half of the offshore area in 1,000 
feet of water or less is underlain by 
young sediments of a tertiary age which 
have a record of greater average yield 
per well and per discovery than the 
older sediments 1 9 must be tempered by 
some knowledge of the economics of 
production. In order to be profitable, 
the expected greater yield per well must 
offset the usually higher costs of ex-
ploration, production, and transporta-
tion, which vary considerably with 
water depth, distance from land, and 
ocean environment. For example, the 
operating costs of exploratory drilling 
under prevailing weather conditions in 
the North Sea may be twice as high as 
the cost of drilling at similar depth in 
areas with generally favorable weather 
conditions such as in Indonesian waters. 
In the Arctic Circle, on the other hand, 
exploring and producing offshore oil 
and gas may again be several times 
higher than drilling in the North Sea.2 0 
A United Nations study undertaken in 
1970 estimated the average cost of 
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exploratory drilling between $350,000 transportation facilities. The high cost 
and $2 million per well and for wells of offshore development has an im-
currently being drilled in the North Sea portant bearing on the size of fields that 
as much as $5 million?1 Production can be economically exploited. 
and completion costs also rise sharply Reservoirs that might be considered rich 
with water depth, at least up to 1,500 in recoverable oil or gas on land are not 
feet, and are subject to environmental necessarily profitable in the oceans; but 
constraints. Hence, production costs again there are considerable regional 
may rise from $1.5 million in shallow differences. While relatively small off-
waters of 100 feet, to $4 million in 350 shore fields may be profitably exploited 
feet and $12 million in 600 feet.22 in calm waters where production costs 
Platforms costing between $1 million are rather low, in the Arctic only fields 
and $2 million in the Gulf of Mexico of giant size are commercially attractive. 
would cost between 8 and 15 million at It should be noted that 81 percent of 
similar depth at Cook Inlet, Alaska. the world's current offshore production 
Transportation and storage costs are is a product of giant fields, i.e., fields 
also related to water depth and oceanic containing 500 million barrels or 
conditions. 'Plus, an underwater pipe- more. 2 5 
line of only 8-inch in Alaska is 1.5 times Offshore petroleum exploitation is 
more expensive than an average 30-inch particularly subject to technological 
pipeline in the Gulf of Mexico.2 3 changes which can eventually bring 
A recent study on cost variations of about substantial cost-savings. For ex-
offshore petroleum development came ample, the ability to drill up to 60 wells 
up with the estimates shown in the table from one single platform employing 
below.24 Cost differences, associated directional drilling techniques is a con-
with variations in ocean environment, siderable improvement over earlier prac-
are due to the need for specially tices when only one or a few wells could 
designed equipment, capable of with- be drilled from one platform. Progress 
standing weather conditions varying in subsea completion, production, and 
from areas with year-round calm servicing will also result in large cost-
weather to stormy winter conditions in savings in moderately deep and deep 
the North Sea and the icy waters of the waters and under adverse weather condi-
Arctic. Moreover, in some areas bottom tions in areas where currently fixed 
currents are very strong and platforms platforms are used. 
need to be cemented deep into the In addition to high development 
ocean floor, while in other areas there costs, offshore leases have continued to 
are hardly any bottom currents and rise throughout the decades of the 
platforms can rest on the seafloor. Costs fifties and sixties. In the Gulf of Mexi-
also increase with water depth and co, sales of federal wildcat leases went 
distance from land and markets because up from an average of $294 per ac:e in 
of increased expense for drilling, 1954 to $3,187 per acre in December 
production, servicing, storage, and 1972.26 The costs of offshore leases are 



















expected to climb even higher when the 
remaining areas with oil potential are 
divided up into concessions, the ratio 
between reserves and production de-
clines, and profit expectations increase_ 
In the United States there is no alter-
nate to competitive bidding, even if it 
means that large amount,s of capital 
must be committed for leases many 
years before any return on investment 
can be realized and with no guarantee of 
success.27 
Some have speculated that the com-
bination of regulated domestic prices 
and high offshore exploration and de-
velopment costs have kept profits con-
siderably below those of similar invest-
ments on land. 2 8 While exploration and 
development costs were higher offshore 
than on land, reserve additions per foot 
drilled were 2 to 2~ times higher 
offshore.29 Exploration, development, 
and production costs were estimated at 
$2.34 per barrel for offshore Louisiana 
crude, which even at 1970 U.S. prices 
was profitable, and at the current price 
of more than $5 per barrel for oil 
produced from old wells and over $10 
for oil from new wells, this is very 
profitable indeed! 
A major factor slowing down world-
wide petroleum development efforts for 
many years was the readily available 
low-cost Middle Eastern crude. There 
was little incentive to engage in costly 
deep-water activities, and consequently, 
only large fields in shallow waters of less 
than 300 feet were exploited. Even 
those ventures were barely profitable at 
pre-1973 prices. Indeed, as late as Janu-
ary 1972, there was some consensus 
among oil company executives that with 
the exception of the Santa Barbara 
Channel, expansion into water deeper 
than 600 feet would lag because of 
economic considerations. Many ex-
pressed doubt that fields of 200-300 
million barrels (a typical good field in 
the Gulf of Mexico) would prove eco-
nomical in deep water, considering the 
present state of the art.3 0 This situation 
has markedly changed. While the pro-
duction cost of Middle Eastern oil is 
expected to continue to be less than 20 
cents per barrel until the 1980's, the 
posted price (the artificial price on 
which taxes and royalties are calculated) 
rose more than 400 percent between 
late 1972 and December 1973 to 
$11.65 per barrel for light Arabian 
crude. Hence, earlier studies predicting 
that oil from other than giant or super-
giant fields in shallow waters would not 
be able to compete favorably with 
alternative sources of supply warrant 
complete revision. Several companies 
expecting higher future return on invest-
ment from developments in deeper 
waters have leased tracts off West Africa 
in water depth up to 3,000 meters, and 
many countries around the world have 
sold leases for areas beyond 200 meters. 
A major constraint on offshore de-
velopment is the shortage of skilled 
personnel and drilling equipment. Since 
July 1973, when the Federal Govern-
ment allowed prices for newly dis-
covered oil to fluctuate, the demand for 
rigs, drilling equipment, and oil pipe 
rapidly expanded. Unfortunately this 
happened at a time when world demand 
for drilling equipment was also at an 
all-time high, and steel was in short 
supply. Delivery delays ran as long as 18 
months. Even though the drill industry 
will increase output, it will take a few 
years before the new rigs will be on the 
market. Experts also agree that there is 
a serious shortage of skilled man-
power31 caused in part by the fact that 
a great deal of the work involves ex-
perience, and additional training schools 
will not solve the short-term problem. 
One industry observer claimed that 
shortage of equipment and manpower 
will trim expansion down to about 
one-half of earlier estimates. 32 
Ownership of Seabed Resources and 
Security of Investments. To date, at 
least 107 nations have confirmed that 
the coastal state has jurisdiction over 
minerals in submerged areas adjacent to 
its coast. This confirmation has taken 
the form of domestic legislation, uni-
lateral declarations, regional treaties, 
offshore concessions, or ratification of 
the 1958 Convention on the Conti-
nental Shelf. 
Under the terms of the 1958 conven-
tion signed and ratified by 39 coastal 
states, the Continental Shelf is defmed 
as: 33 
... the seabed and subsoil of the 
submarine areas adjacent to the 
coast but outside the area of the 
territorial sea to a depth of 200 
meters or beyond that limit to 
where the depth of the super-
jacent waters admits of the ex-
ploitation of the natural resources 
of the said areas .... 
Hence, by the convention, ownership 
of seabed resources is subject to two 
qualifications: that the area is "ad-
jacent" and that the depth of the 
superjacent waters admits of the ex-
ploitation. During the preparatory 
stages of the 1958 Law of the Sea 
Conference, several states proposed defi-
nite limits to the Continental Shelf, but 
none of these could win the majority 
needed for adoption. After 6 years the 
International Law Commission that had 
been charged with the preparatory work 
of the conference in 1950 was still 
debating the merits of either a depth 
limit at the 200-meter isobath or a limit 
defined by exploitability. 
While a specific depth limit at the 
200-meter isobath would have been 
definitive, it would have discriminated 
against countries with narrow Conti-
nental Shelves. Most states on the west 
coast of South America, for example, 
have generally narrow shelves (in some 
areas even as little as 1 mile or less), 
while other nations such as Argentina, 
Australia, and the entire northern Arctic 
region have wide shelves, often ex-
tending hundreds of miles out to sea. 
Latin American countries, meeting in 
Ciudad Trujillo from 15 to 28 March 
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1956, submitted a compromise formula 
which would give the coastal state ex-
clusive jurisdiction over the resources of 
submarine areas outside the territorial 
sea to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond 
that limit, to where the depth of the 
superjacent waters admits of the ex-
ploitation of the natural resources of 
the seabed and subsoil.34 At its eighth 
session in 1956, the International Law 
Commission adopted the Latin Ameri-
can formula, and, in the interest of 
compromise, the Geneva Conference 
endorsed the Commission's definition of 
the Continental Shelf.3 5 
International lawyers greatly differ 
over the interpretation of the defmition. 
It could be interpreted that as tech-
nology improves, the state will be able 
to claim that there is no actual limit to 
the Continental Shelf. Shigoru Oda, for 
example, argued that under this conven-
tion it could be inferred that: " ... all 
the submarine areas of the world have 
been theoretically divided among the 
coastal state at the deepest trenches. 
This is the logical conclusion to be 
drawn from the provisions approved at 
the Geneva Convention.,,3 6 
On the other hand, the adjacency 
clause in the definition could be in-
terpreted as to imply that even if 
technology were available, national 
jurisdiction cannot be extended unless 
the area is situated adjacent to the 
coastal state. A significant number of 
states voiced support for the concept of 
a finite Continental Shelf by express 
provisions in their national declarations, 
and the International Law Commission 
(ILC) which prepared the 1958 Geneva 
Conference, clearly did not intend the 
exploitability criterion to be a blank 
check for any ocean depth.3 7 Judge 
Fitzmaurice, for example, pointed out 
that the concept of the Continental 
Shelf and the submarine areas did not 
allow any interpretation which would 
be "tantamount to appropriation of a 
part of the high seas," and Garcia-
Amador, the chairman of the ILC, said 
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that "the adjacent areas ended at the 
point where the slope down to the 
ocean began, which was not much more 
than 25 miles from the COast.,,3 8 The 
adoption of the 1967 United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution 2340, es-
tablishing an ad hoc committee to study 
the peaceful uses of the seabed and the 
ocean floor beyond the limits of na-
tional jurisdiction, indicates that a ma-
jority of states recognize that the area 
of the seabed over which nations can 
exercise sovereignty is limited. 
As to the limits of national jurisdic-
tion over seabed resources, Professor 
Louis Henkin of Columbia University 
argues. that, although national sover-
eignty is not limited to the 200-meter 
isobath, the area is closely limited by 
the very use of the term "Continental 
Shelf," ... which is itself a geological 
term and does not include the Continen-
tal Slope, the Continental Rise, or the 
Continental Terrace. It is clear the 
framers were not intending to limit 
themselves strictly to the Continental 
Shelf as geologically conceived, but it is 
also clear that they were trying not to 
get too far away from it either.3 9 
The National Petroleum Council 
(NPC), an advisory body of the Depart-
ment of the Interior of the United 
States, has taken the position that under 
the 1958 definition of the Continental 
Shelf, states are. entitled to claim sub-
marine areas encompassing the conti-
nental margins.40 The NPC's position is 
based upon the language of the Conven-
tion on the Continental Shelf, the 
records of the International Law Com-
mission and the conference which nego-
tiated and signed it, the practice of a 
large number of states in leasing seabed 
areas in water depth considerably be-
yond 200 meters, the records of the 
U.S. executive branch and the Senate 
during the ratification process, opinions 
of the International Court of Justice in 
the North Sea Channel Continental 
Shelf case, the conclusion of a majority 
of professional and scholarly bodies that 
have studied the question, and, the 
views and recommendations of geology 
experts concerning the profound dif-
ferentiatiOIL between the submerged 
continental mass and the deep ocean 
ba · 41 sm. 
In the Continental Shelf cases be-
tween the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the Kingdoms of Denmark and the 
Netherlands, the International Court of 
Justice decided on 20 February 1969, 
that: 
. .. the rights of the coastal state 
in respect of the area of Continen-
tal Shelf that constitutes a natural 
prolongation of its land territory 
into and under the sea exist IPSO 
FACTO and AB INITIO, by virtue 
of its sovereignty over the land, 
and as an extension of it in an 
exercise of sovereign rights for the 
purpose of exploring the seabed 
and exploiting its natural re-
sources. In short, there is here an 
inherent right. .. 42 
The NPC maintains that the Court's 
judgment supports the position that 
coastal states have exclusive rights over 
the natural resources of all the sub-
merged areas which form the under-
water prolongation of such nation's land 
territory. According to the National 
Petroleum Council, geological evidence 
proves the Continental Slope and at 
least the landward portion of the Conti-
nental Rise to constitute a part of the 
prolongation of the land territory of the 
continent.43 
As is so often the case, the solution 
to one problem has created others. 
Coastal states can now extend national 
jurisdiction for the purpose of seabed 
resources exploration and exploitation 
out to at least a water depth of 200 
meters, but now an effort must be made 
to determine Continental Shelf boun-
daries between opposite and adjacent 
states in areas of shallow waters. De-
limitation of the Continental Shelf is 
regulated under article 6 of the 1958 
Convention on the Continenuu Sheli, 
which states that: 
Where the same continental shelf 
is adjacent to the territories of 
two or more states whose coasts 
are opposite each other, the boun-
dary of the continental shelf ap-
pertaining to such states shall be 
determined by agreement between 
them. In the absence of agree-
ment, and unless another boun-
dary line is justified by special 
circumstances, the boundary is 
the median line, every point of 
which is equidistant from the 
nearest points of the baselines 
from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea of each state is 
measured. Where the same conti-
nental shelf is adjacent to the 
territories of two adjacent states, 
the boundary of the continental 
shelf shall be determined by agree-
ment between them. In the 
absence of agreement, and unless 
another boundary shall be deter-
mined by application of the prin-
ciple of equidistance from the 
nearest points of the baselines 
from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea of each state is 
measured.44 
In the North Sea Continental Shelf 
cases, the International Court of Justice 
rejected the German claim that delimita-
tion of the shelf should be governed by 
the principle that each state is entitled 
to a just and equitable share, but it also 
dismissed a submission by Denmark and 
the Netherlands that delimitation 
should follow a principle of equi-
distance in the absence of agreement or 
unless another boundary is justified by 
special circumstances.45 The Court 
found that no one single method of 
delimitation was likely to prove satis-
factory in all circumstances, that delimi-
tation should be carried out by agree-
ment or by reference to arbitration, and 
that it should be effected on equitable 
principles.46 
397 
Additional complications in the 
process of determining Continenuu 
Shelf boundaries arise from the exis-
tence of special circumstances such as 
trenches in shallow seas, offshore islands 
used as basepoints, and islands midway 
between two states in narrow shallow 
seas. Several bilateral agreements in-
volving special circumstances have been 
successfully negotiated between North 
Sea countries and between states in the 
Persian Gulf area.4 7 In the East and 
South China Seas, however, opposing 
claims over islets, straight baselines, ~d 
trenches in potentially oil-rich areas,. 
/ have at least in one instance evolved 
into an ongoing, militarY -clash-between 
China and South Vietnam. 
In the years following the 1958 
Conference on the Law of the Sea, 
science and technology advanced to the 
degree that the seabed beyond a water 
depth of 200 meters became accessible 
for mineral exploration, and the actual 
mining of seabed and subsoil resources 
was expected to follow soon. Clearly 
the present chaotic legal void left by the 
first Law of the Sea Conference needed 
to be filled, and according to a report 
issued by the Secretary General of the 
United Nations: 
... The relevant principles of in-
ternational law do not provide 
detailed guidance and regulations 
as regards the exploration and 
exploitation of mineral resources 
of the area of the seabed and 
ocean floor beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction, nor has 
precise legal status of that area 
been decided or its exact boun-
daries set ... 48 
When more knowledge about seabed 
resources became available, a growing 
number of nations began to extend 
national jurisdiction unilaterally, in 
several cases up to 200 nautical miles 
from the coast. 
Following a speech on the wealth of 
the seabed by Ambassador Arvid Pardo 
in the United Nations, the General 
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Assembly established an ad hoc commit-
tee to study the peaceful uses of the 
seabed and the ocean floor beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction. On the 
basis of an ad hoc committee report 
issued the following year, a permanent 
committee was formed, and on 15 
December 1969, it, in turn, adopted a 
resolution requesting the Secretary 
General to review the opinions of mem-
ber states on convening a new Law of 
the Sea Conference to determine the 
future regime for the oceans. 
By Resolution 2750C, the General 
Assembly decided to convene in 1973 
such a conference which -among others 
-would deal with the establishment of 
precise and uniform limits of national 
jurisdiction over the resources of the 
seabed and subsoil.4 9 A machinery was 
set up to determine the agenda, date, 
location, and duration of the confer-
ence, and since 1971 six preparatory 
sessions have been held in Geneva and 
New York. The Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the 
Ocean Boor Beyond the Limits of 
National Jurisdiction, usually called the 
Seabed Committee, formed three sub-
committees, each charged with specific 
responsibilities. Of the three, Sub-
committee II is responsible to prepare a 
comprehensive list of subjects and issues 
concerning the Continental Shelf, the 
territorial sea and the contiguous zone, 
fishing and conservation of the living 
resources of the high seas, and to 
prepare draft treaty articles thereon.5 0 
The basic problem is to accom-
modate the needs and interests of the 
coastal states who demand an extension 
of resource jurisdiction with the in-
terests of other states and the world 
community at large. 
For the developing countries in-
volved in the dispute, extension of 
exclusive jurisdiction over resources 
beyond the territorial sea is the single 
most important issue. Spearheaded by a 
small group of Latin American countries 
claiming a 200-mile maritime zone, the 
demand for protection of resources 
beyond a narrow territorial sea gained 
momentum during the 1960's and has 
found widespread acceptance in Africa 
and Asia in recent years. 
The first in a series of developments 
suggesting a trend toward acceptance of 
a 200-mile limit was the Declaration of 
Montevideo of August 1970, whereby 
nine Latin American States specifically 
recognized the right of coastal states to 
extend national jurisdiction to a dis-
tance of 200 nautical miles, measured 
from the baseline of the territorial 
limits. 5 1 A few months later a larger 
number of Latin American States 
meeting in Lima, Peru, confirmed the 
right of coastal states to establish the 
limits of maritime jurisdiction "in ac-
cordance with reasonable criteria, 
having regard to its geographical, geo-
logical and biological characteristics, 
and the need to make rational use of its 
resources. ,,52 Following the Monte-
video and Lima declarations, the Carib-
bean countries met in Santo Domingo in 
July 1972 and agreed on what could 
become a universal formula to reconcile 
nations demanding narrow territorial 
limits and those claiming jurisdiction 
out to 200 nautical miles. The Carib-
bean nations introduced a new concept, 
the "patrimonial sea" of 200 miles, in 
which states would have sovereign rights 
over all ocean resources. Territorial 
limits would be restricted to 12 miles.53 
At a seminar of high-level government 
officials in Yaounde' (Ivory Coast) in 
June of the same year, participants 
recommended to African States to ex-
tend their jurisdiction over all the re-
sources of the high seas area adjacent to 
their territorial sea within an economic 
zone to be established. 54 A year later, 
in May 1973, the Council of Ministers 
of the Organization of African Unity 
recognized the right of coastal states to 
establish an exclusive economic zone 
not exceeding 200 nautical miles. 5 5 
China, Canada, Australia, and a growing 
number of others, particularly de-
veloping countries, appear ready to 
endorse the concept. 
At the preparatory conferences for 
the law of the sea, which have been held 
in Geneva and New York since 1970, 
some countries have proposed a uniform 
limit of 200 miles within which coastal 
states will have exclusive jurisdiction 
over all resources, pollution, and scien-
tific research. Others, with broad con-
tinental margins, want to extend exclu-
sive jurisdiction to the outer edge of the 
margins beyond 200 miles, and a num-
ber of landlocked and shelf-locked 
states prefer a limit of 200 meters or 40 
miles, with an additional intermediate 
zone of 40 miles within which the 
coastal state would have preferential 
and veto rights over exploitation. If 
accepted, the latter proposal would re-
serve some two-fifths of the world's 
estimated recoverable offshore oil and 
gas resources for the international com-
munity. The Soviet Union, with its 
extensive, shallow Arctic Sea, has 
proposed to limit coastal state jurisdic-
tion to a depth of 500 meters or 100 
miles, whichever is further from shore, 
and the United States propounds a 
Coastal Seabed Economic Area within 
which the coastal state could exercise 
exclusive jurisdiction (subject to certain 
provisions) out to 200 miles or to the 
edge of the continental margins. The 
new U.S. proposal would leave the 
international community little of any 
valuable oil and gas resources. 
Agreements on the limits of national 
jurisdiction over seabed resources are 
compounded by considerable differ-
ences of opinion over fisheries. While 
proponents of a simple 200-mile eco-
nomic or resource zone tend to stress 
coastal state rights in the area, they are 
usually silent on coastal states duties. 
They also overlook the management 
problems arising from the adoption of a 
200·mile economic zone. Maritime 
states that have traditionally fished in 
distant waters (U.S.S.R., Japan, and 
others) are opposed to granting coastal 
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states exclusive jurisdiction over living 
resources out to 200 miles. Japan and 
the Soviet Union recognize the special 
interest of coastal states beyond terri-
torial limits but maintain that regu-
latory measures should be established in 
agreement with other states engaged in 
fishing in the area. The positions of 
most coastal developing nations and 
nations possessing long-range fleets are 
still far apart on the degree of manage-
ment responsibilities and catch alloca-
tion rights of coastal states in the areas 
adjacent to a 12-mile territorial sea. The 
United States, with mixed coastal and 
distant interests, does not favor any 
specific limit to exclusive fishing rights, 
but its proposals provide for coastal 
state jurisdiction over coastal and ana-
dromous species to the full extent of 
their migratory range. 5 6 
As the final outcome is expected to 
be a package deal, the resources issue 
cannot be debated in complete isolation 
from other problems. These include 
questions of transit through straits used 
by international traffic, the limits of the 
territorial sea, the nature and manage-
ment of the international regime be-
yond the economic zone, et cetera. 
Many proponents of extensive coastal 
state jurisdiction are primarily in-
terested in resources and are willing to 
give in to maritime nations' demand for 
narrow territorial limits, provided that 
their resource interests will be pro-
tected. The United States and other 
maritime powers, in turn, are prepared 
to accept extension of territorial limits 
to 12 miles and coastal state jurisdiction 
over resources beyond the territorial 
sea, provided there is agreement on free 
transit through straits used for inter-
national navigation and that the in-
terests of both the states and the inter-
national community are recognized in 
the economic zone. Provided that gen-
eral agreement on all major issues will 
be reached, acceptance of a 200-mile 
economic zone appears likely, with 
some compensation to states with wide 
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continental margins. 
Recent increases in the price of crude 
oil will have a negative effect on the 
economies of many developing coun-
tries, and this, in turn, may serve as an 
additional incentive to claim the re-
sources of the entire potentially oil-rich 
continental margins. In light of this fact, 
the United States insists on safeguards 
for its oil drilling industry, in the form 
of a security of investment clause and 
on compulsory dispute settlement. 
Initial capital outlays for development 
of oilfields beneath the seabed are very 
high, and it takes years before the first 
revenue can be expected. Such vast 
investments can only be made if they 
are protected by international agree-
ment and if, in case of serious disagree-
ments, disputes will be subject to com-
pulsory claims settlement. Security of 
investment is in the interests of both the 
investors and the coastal states with 
offshore resources. Most developing 
coastal states rely on foreign capital for 
the exploration and exploitation of 
their offshore petroleum resources, and 
the willingness of these international 
investors to meet capital demands will 
be significantly enhanced by the degree 
of security provided to the companies 
developing the offshore resources. 
The new Law of the Sea Conference 
is scheduled to commence in Caracas, 
Venezuela, in August 1974 and will last 
until draft treaties are completed and 
agreed upon. Acceptance of exclusive 
national jurisdiction for the exploration 
and exploitation of seabed resources 
extending out to 200 miles from the 
coast, or even over the entire continen-
tal margins, is likely to result in opti-
mum resources exploitation, provided 
that articles related to security of invest-
ment and compulsory claims settlement 
are included. 
Ocean Oil and the Energy Crisis. 
Although one may expect that offshore 
petroleum production will grow at a 
faster rate than predicted prior to the 
I 
recent price hikes, it is not likely to 
solve our worldwide energy problems. 
These are the result of not only limited 
resources but of Government inter-
ference with the market system and, 
more recently, the creation of an arti-
ficial shortage by the major petroleum 
exporting nations. 
Before the Arab embargo, oil needs 
in the United States were calculated to 
increase by 25 percent between 1972 
and 1976,5 7 but in view of higher prices 
and conservation measures, the actual 
increase may be somewhat lower. As 
domestic onshore production reached 
its peak in 1970 and no North Slope oil 
is expected to reach the market until 
the late 1970's, additional supplies have 
to be imported. 
Recent Government policy to allow 
the price of old and new domestic crude 
to rise considerably will certainly lead 
to a renewed search for additional re-
serves. Moreover, higher prices will 
make it economical to increase output 
from existing wells onshore and off-
shore with secondary and tertiary re-
covery techniques. However, while po-
tential offshore resources are known to 
be substantial, it takes between 4~ and 
9~ years between the time when funds 
are committed for exploration and 
actual full production. On average, it 
takes from 1 to 3 years of geophysical 
work to locate a commercially attractive 
oilfield and another 2 years of ex-
ploratory drilling before oil is found. 
Once petroleum is located, it takes 
about 6 to 18 months to build produc-
tion platforms and to set them in place 
and another 2 to 3 years to bring a 
platform to full production. 
President Nixon's recent energy 
policy has improved our long-term 
energy oudook, but, even under the 
most optimistic conditions, the National 
Petroleum Council has estimated that 
we will still be dependent for 11 percent 
of total energy needs from foreign 
sources of supply by 1985.58 The ques-
tion is, from where? Currently we 
import most of our foreign oil from 
Canada and Venezuela, but Western 
Hemisphere sources have almost reached 
their limits, and consequently most of 
the additional imports will have to be 
supplied by such areas as the Middle 
East and North Africa. Aside from the 
danger of reliance on vital energy sup-
plies from politically unstable sources, 
the Assistant Secretary for Energy and 
Minerals of the Department of the 
Interior, Stephen A. Wakefield, said that 
" ... considering the effect of recent oil 
increases on the economies of the east-
ern hemisphere producing nations, their 
production rates would in all proba-
bility not be expanded enough to meet 
the combined .1980 projected demands 
of Europe, Japan and the U.S. at any 
price ... ,,59 
Hence, additional world demand 
must be met from other sources of 
supply to meet even a downward ad-
justed demand for petroleum and to 
prevent potential serious conflict be-
tween the United States and its allies 
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over Middle East imports. The continen-
tal margins of the world offer a unique 
solution to our medium-term energy 
problems. In contrast to onshore petro-
leum resources, offshore prospects are 
more evenly divided among the nations 
of the five continents. Diversification of 
exploratory and development activities 
is a good guarantee against future sup-
ply interruptions for political or eco-
nomic reasons. However, it will take 
several years and vast amounts of capital 
to search for and produce from new 
offshore fields. In the meantime, grow-
ing dependence on the Middle East 
cannot" be avoided, regardless of suc-
cesses in our search for new sources of 
supply. The economic, political, and 
military consequences are obvious, and 
it will take superior leadership to bridge 
the temporary domestic and worldwide 
energy shortage while avoiding an eco-
I nomic recession at home and a danger-
ous scramble for limited supplies be-
tween the countries of the Western 
alliance. 
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